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In a heterogeneous population which can be partitioned into well-defined subgroups, it is 
plausible that the extent of measured aggregate poverty should depend upon the distribution of 
poverty across the subgroups. A judgment in favour of an equal inter-group distribution of 
poverty could arise in two ways. In the first approach, equality is upheld as an intrinsic social 
virtue, and the aggregate measure of poverty, in line with this view, is ‘adjusted’ to reflect the 
extent of inter-group disparity in the distribution of poverty that obtains. In the present paper, 
this approach is examined, with specific reference to the advancement of a diagrammatic aid to 
analysis called the group poverty profile. In the second approach, equality is upheld for 
instrumental reasons which arise from the observed fact that any individual’s level of 
deprivation is a function not only of one’s own income, but of the general level of prosperity of 
the group to which one is affiliated. Individual deprivation functions are specialized to a form 
which reflects this ‘group-affiliation’ externality, and the resulting poverty measure is studied 
with respect to its properties, and its implications for inter-group equity. The analysis is briefly 
extended to a review of the measurement of literacy, along externality-motivated lines 
suggested elsewhere by Basu and Foster. The paper concludes that social realism in   
the measurement of deprivation is often compromised by mainstream approaches to   
economic theorizing in which both heterogeniety and group-related externalities are generally 
de-emphasized. 
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1 Introduction 
Two aspects of social reality  frequently encountered  are that populations are 
heterogeneous and that deprivation at an individual level is a function of the deprivation 
status of the group to which the individual is affiliated. The first aspect could pave the 
way for measuring aggregate poverty in such a way that group-related disparities in the 
distribution of poverty are explicitly taken into account and penalized. The second could 
pave the way for measuring poverty in such a way that individual deprivation is seen to 
depend on group deprivation, so that ‘group-affiliation externalities’ are explicitly 
reckoned in the assessment of overall poverty. In either case, it turns out that inter-group 
equality in the distribution of poverty is a valued outcome—for intrinsic reasons of the 
desirability of equality as a social virtue in the first case, and for instrumental reasons 
arising from the link between externality and equity in the second case. In the present 
paper, both the ‘intrinsic’ and the ‘instrumental’ cases for reckoning inter-group 
differentials in the measurement of aggregate poverty are investigated. 
The ‘intrinsic’ approach has been examined by Anand and Sen (1995) in the context of 
deriving a ‘gender-adjusted human development index’, and variations on this theme 
have been explored by Jayaraj and Subramanian (1999), Majumdar and Subramanian 
(2000), Subramanian and Majumdar (2002), and Subramanian (2004b). The 
Subramanian and Majumdar paper provides an axiomatic justification for a specific 
‘group inequality-adjusted’ aggregate index of deprivation. In this paper, a 
diagrammatic link to that index, in the form of a graph called the ‘group poverty 
profile’, which is directly inspired by Shorrocks’ (1995, 1996) ‘poverty gap profile’ 
employed in a different context, is advanced. The poverty gap profile could prove to be 
a useful instrument (not unlike the Lorenz curve in inequality measurement) for 
comparing alternative regimes of the inter-group distribution of poverty. 
The ‘instrumental’ approach has been explored by Basu and Foster (1998) in the context 
of deriving an ‘externality-adjusted’ measure of literacy. An application to the poverty 
context can also be found in Jayaraj and Subramanian (2000). The underlying idea here 
is that deprivation at the level of an individual is a function not only of her own income 
but also of the average income of the group to which she belongs. A poverty index 
which displays this sort of group-related externality is presented as an illustrative 
outcome of this approach to measuring aggregate poverty, and its implications for inter-
group equality in the distribution of poverty, as well as for poverty rankings and poverty 
axiomatics, are examined. It is also shown—through a consideration of the literacy 
measurement problem—that the ‘externality’ approach is a general one with useful 
specific applications to the measurement of various social indicators. 
Both approaches to reckoning subgroup poverty in the measurement of overall poverty 
suggest that departures from the conventional assumptions of ‘homogeneity’ and 
‘individualism’ can have non-trivial implications for how we view and measure poverty. 
In addressing these issues, this paper has been organized as follows. Section 2 deals 
with the preliminaries of concepts and definitions. Section 3 examines the ‘intrinsic’ 
case for inter-group equality, with an emphasis on the graphical device called the group 
poverty profile. Section 4 analyses the ‘instrumental’ case for inter-group equality, by 
exploring the possibility of a group-affiliation externality determining deprivation status 
at the individual level. Section 5 concludes.   2
2  Concepts and definitions 
Let N be the set of positive integers, R the real line, and R++ the positive real line. For 
every n∈N, let Xn be the set of non-negative n-vectors x = (x1,…,xi,…xn), where xi is 
the income of individual i in a community of n individuals. Define the set X ≡ ∪n∈NXn. 
Let the poverty line be denoted by z, where z is a positive and finite income level such 
that all persons with income less than z are identified as being poor. For all x∈X, N(x) 
will stand for the set of all individuals whose incomes are represented in the income 
distribution x, and Q(x) will stand for the set of poor individuals. Next—and drawing on 
Jayaraj and Subramanian (1999) and Subramanian (2004b)—for every n∈N, let Gn be 
the set of all possible partitions of the set N = {1,…,n}, and define the set G ≡ ∪n∈NGn. 
Every g∈G is some partition of the population, induced by some appropriate grouping, 
for example on the basis of race, caste, gender, etc.; and the elements of g—denoted by 
the running index j—will be taken to be subgroups of the population. Clearly, for every 
g∈G and n∈N, it will be the case that 1 ≤ #g ≤ n. Two polar cases of grouping are the 
atomistic grouping g
a which induces the finest partition {{1},…,{n}} of {1,…,n}, and 
the universal grouping g
u which induces the grossest partition {{1,…,n}} of {1,…,n}. 
For all (x,g)∈XxG, the pair (x,g) will be said to be a compatible pair if and only if g 
partitions a population whose size is the same as the dimensionality of x. Given any 
compatible pair (x,g)∈XxG, xj will stand for subgroup j’s income vector, and μj ≡ μ(xj) 
will stand for the mean income of subgroup j, for every j∈g. Further, for all compatible 
(x,g)∈XxG, x
i will stand for the income vector of the subgroup of g to which person i 
belongs, and μ
i ≡ μ(x
i) will denote the average income of the subgroup to which i 
belongs, for every i∈N(x). We now define a poverty index formally. 
A poverty index is a mapping P: R++xXxG → R such that, for every z∈R++, and every 
compatible pair (x,g)∈XxG, P(z,x,g) specifies a real number which is intended to 
represent the extent of poverty associated with the regime (z,x,g). 
Certain standard axioms invoked in the measurement of poverty are now swiftly and 
informally reviewed. Focus (Axiom F) requires the poverty index to be invariant with 
respect to increases in non-poor incomes; continuity (Axiom C) requires the poverty 
index to be continuous on Xn for every n∈N; normalization (Axiom N) requires the 
poverty index to attain a lower bound of zero when there is no poor person in the 
community; symmetry (Axiom S) requires the poverty index to be invariant to any inter-
personal permutation of incomes; monotonicity (Axiom M) [respectively, weak 
monotonicity (Axiom WM)] requires the poverty measure to rise [respectively, not 
decline] with a decline in the income of any poor person; respect for income dominance 
(Axiom D; see Amiel and Cowell 1994, and Subramanian 2004b) requires that, ceteris 
paribus, poverty associated with the vector x be lower than that associated with the 
vector y whenever x vector-dominates y; transfer (Axiom T) requires that the poverty 
index register a decline in value whenever, other things equal, there is a rank-preserving 
transfer of income from a poor person to a poorer person; decomposability (Axiom D) 
requires the poverty index to be expressible as a population-share weighted average of 
sub-group poverty levels; and subgroup sensitivity (Axiom SS; see Jayaraj and 
Subramanian 1999, and Subramanian 2004b) requires that, other things equal, poverty 
should decline whenever a pure redistribution of incomes between two groups causes 
the relatively disadvantaged group to become less poor and the relatively advantaged 
group to become poorer while maintaining the relative poverty rankings of the two 
groups.   3
A poverty index P is said to be degenerate with respect to grouping (or just degenerate) 
if, for every z∈R++, every x∈X and all distinct g,g′∈G such that (x,g) and (x,g′) are 
compatible pairs, it is the case that P(z,x,g) = P(z,x,g′), that is, the value of the poverty 
index is invariant with respect to the grouping employed. For future reference, we shall 
denote by Π the set of poverty indices which are symmetric, weakly monotonic, 
decomposable, normalized to lie in the interval [0,1], and degenerate. 
3  Poverty aggregation when inter-group equality is intrinsically valued 
It can be shown that a poverty index which is required to simultaneously satisfy the sets 
of requirements constituted by {symmetry, monotonicity, subgroup sensitivity}, or 
{respect for income dominance, transfer, subgroup sensitivity}, could run into existence 
problems, on which see Subramanian 2004b: Propositions 4.1 and 4.2. In assessing 
these impossibility results, the author points to the problematic outcome of insisting on 
the universal validity of certain axioms irrespective of the context in which they are 
invoked. A reasonable way out might be to restrict the applicability of a given axiom to 
a domain that is relatively non-controversial. Thus, in the case of the symmetry axiom, 
one may require its brief to extend only to the extent that within any subgroup, 
swapping incomes across members of the subgroup should not alter the level of 
subgroup poverty, and that in a between-group context, the level of aggregate poverty 
should not vary with the way in which the subgroups are labeled. Similarly, with the 
transfer axiom, its sway could be limited to interpersonal income redistributions within 
a subgroup, while in a between-group context one could require that for a given level of 
poverty averaged across the subgroups, aggregate poverty should increase with an 
increase in inequality in the inter-group distribution of poverty. Poverty indices which 
satisfy these restricted versions of symmetry and transfer also possess the virtue of a 
certain sort of ‘flexibility’, in terms of which, for example, an inter-personal transfer 
across members of different subgroups which reduces inter-group disparity in the 
distribution of poverty may or may not reduce aggregate poverty, depending on how 
regressive the transfer is: a more rather than less regressive transfer could be partial to 
the transfer axiom at the expense of the subgroup sensitivity axiom, and the other way 
around with a less rather than more regressive transfer. Examples of such poverty 
indices are available in a poverty-related version of the Anand-Sen ‘gender-adjusted 
human development index’, and in the measure advanced by Jayraj and Subramanian 
(1999), and discussed in Subramanian and Majumdar (2002). These poverty measures 
are presented below. 
First, let (x,g) be a compatible pair belonging to XxG, and let z be any poverty line. Let 
π be any poverty index belonging to the set Π of measures which are symmetric, weakly 
monotonic, decomposable, normalized to lie in the interval [0,1], and degenerate. We 
shall assume that g partitions the population into K exclusive and exhaustive subgroups. 
π will stand for the non-increasingly ordered vector of subgroup poverty levels   
(π1,…, πj,…, πK), viz. π is ordered such that πj ≥ πj+1 for all j = 1,…,K – 1. We let tj 
stand for the population share of the jth poorest group, and Tj  ≡  Σk=1
jtk for the 
cumulative proportion of the population belonging to groups whose poverty levels are 
greater than or equal to that of the jth group. For future reference, we also define, for 
every j = 1,…,K, the quantity Sj ≡ Σk=K–j+1
Ktk. Recall that since π is a decomposable 
index, it can be written as a population-share weighted sum of subgroup poverty levels: 
π = Σj=1
Ktjπj. If all groups are of the same size, then it is easy to see that all subgroup 
poverty levels (the πj) are accorded the same weight (1/K) by the poverty index π. To   4
secure an egalitarian tilt, one could think of a system of weights in which a higher 
weight is accorded to a subgroup with greater poverty. This is the basic idea underlying 
the construction of ‘group-inequality sensitive’ indices of aggregate poverty. A specific 
version of the Anand-Sen index (suitably adapted to the present context) is the index π
o, 
and the poverty measure advanced in Subramanian and Majumdar (2002) is the index 
π





1/2;  and 
(2) π
oo(z,x,g) = [1/(K-1)]Σj=1
K[(K-1-j)tj + Tj]πj. 
If C* ≡ [(1/π
2)Σj=1
Ktjπj
2] – 1 is the squared coefficient of variation in the inter-group 
distribution of the πj, and G* ≡ [1/π(K+1)]Σj=1
K[(K+1-j)tj + Tj]πj  – 1 is the Gini 




1/2;  and 
(2′) π
oo = π[1 + {(K+1)/(K-1)}G*]. 
Note also that 
(2′′) LimK→∞π
oo = π(1 + G*). 
The indices π
o and π
oo are essentially the average level of poverty (π) enhanced by a 
factor incorporating the extent of inequality in the distribution of the group-specific 
levels of poverty: in this sense, their construction is a reflection of an intrinsic 
preference for inter-group equality. As we have already seen, concerns for group 
identity and inter-group (as distinct from inter-personal) equality could sit uneasily with 
the requirements of canonical axioms like symmetry and transfer. These issues have 
been discussed in some detail in Subramanian (2004b), and will be reviewed, in the 
context of ‘externality-adjusted’ poverty indices, in the following section. For this 
reason, I will not here dwell on these themes. Rather, an alternative way of deriving (a 
close relative of) the index π
oo will be discussed. This entails the use of a graphical 
device called the group poverty profile, in presenting which I shall very closely follow 
Shorrocks’ (1995, 1999) construction of the poverty gap profile.  
Given the ordered vector π of subgroup poverty levels (π1,…, πj,…, πK), the group 
poverty profile (GPP) is obtained as a plot of the points (D0,T0), (D1,T1),…, (Dj,Tj),…, 
(DK,TK), where D0 = T0 ≡ 0 and, for every j = 1,…,K: 
(3) Dj(π;Tj) = Σk=1
jtkπk. 
The GPP is thus constructed by first arranging the subgroups in the order of poorest to 
least poor in terms of the values of the πj; the population-share weighted poverty levels 
are then cumulated across the subgroups and plotted against the cumulative population 
shares of the subgroups; and the graph obtained by connecting the plotted points by 
straight lines yields a ‘piece-wise linear’ version of the GPP. Since the maximum value 
the πj can take is unity, it is clear that the ‘worst-case picture’ is obtained when πj = 1 
for all j, in which situation the GPP will be the diagonal of the unit square, and can be 
called the ‘line of maximal poverty’ (in all of which we are, with appropriate adaptation 
to the context, closely following Shorrocks, 1996). In general, it can be seen that the   5
GPP can be drawn as a non-decreasing, concave curve which lies beneath the diagonal 
of the unit square. The highest point on the GPP is obviously its final point (DK,TK) 
whose height is Σk=1
Ktkπk, or π, recalling that π is a decomposable index. For illustrative 
purposes, a typical GPP is drawn in Figure 1, where K is taken, for specificity, to be 4. 
 
Figure 1 A group poverty profile 
 
Notice from Figure 1 that if there were no inequality in the inter-group distribution of 
poverty levels, that is, if it were the case that πj = π for all j, then the GPP would be the 
straight broken line connecting the points 0 and π in the figure. The actual GPP lies 
above the broken line, and it is natural to attribute the space enclosed by the two curves 
to the fact of an unequal distribution of subgroup poverty levels. Indeed, an inverted 
image of the broken line and the GPP suggests something like a Lorenz curve drawn 
beneath the line of equality, and it is to a construction, precisely, of the group poverty 
Lorenz profile (GPLP) that we now turn. The GPLP is obtained from plotting the points 
(L0,S0), (L1,S1),…,(Lj,Sj),…,(LK,SK), where L0 = S0 ≡ 0 and, for every j = 1,…,K: 
(4) Lj(π;Sj) = (1/π)Σk=K-j+1
Ktkπk. 
The graph is drawn by first ranking the subgroups in non-decreasing order of their 
poverty levels, plotting the cumulative subgroup shares in total poverty against their 
cumulative population shares, and connecting the plotted points by straight lines to yield 
a ‘piece-wise linear’ GPLP. Figure 2 features a typical GPLP drawn within the unit 
square, for the special case in which K = 4.   6
 
Figure 2 A group poverty Lorenz profile 
 
Continuing to follow the lead afforded in Shorrocks (1996), one can see that the group 
poverty profile and the group poverty Lorenz profile are linked by the following 
relationship: 
(5) Dj(π;Tj) = π[1 – LK-j(π;SK–j)], j = 0,1,…,K. 
From (3), (4) and (5) one can see that the lower the GPP or the higher the GPLP is, the 
further away will the GPP be from the line of maximal poverty, and so the ‘better’ may 
we judge the poverty situation to be. This paves the way for comparing alternative 
group poverty distributions in terms of a poverty dominance relationship based on the 
GPP. Specifically, for any given poverty line and grouping which partitions the 
population into K subgroups, we let π ( as before) stand for the non-increasingly 
ordered vector of subgroup poverty levels (π1,…,  πK) and t = (t1,…, tK) for the 
corresponding vector of subgroup population shares. Given π and t, a poverty situation s 
is defined as a K-tuple of pairs of subgroup poverty level and subgroup   



















K)), we shall say that   
s
1 poverty-wise dominates s
2, written as s
1 >P s
2, whenever it is the case that the GPP  
for s
1 lies somewhere below and nowhere above the GPP for s
2. (Of course, when 
subgroup sizes are different in the two poverty situations under comparison, the 
contributions of population size variations and subgroup poverty variations to the 
difference in aggregate poverty between the two situations would need to be 
unscrambled.) In general, the GPP (much like the Lorenz curve employed in standard 
distributional analysis) is a useful visual aid to group-related poverty analysis, and leads 
naturally to the construction of a strict partial ordering of poverty, namely the binary   7
relation >P. It could find particularly fruitful application in the over-time assessment of, 
say, the spatial distribution of poverty. 
Finally, the GPP also paves the way for deriving a measure of aggregate poverty, in 
much the same way as the Lorenz curve paves the way for deriving the Gini coefficient 
of inequality. Specifically—and still closely tracking Shorrocks (1995, 1996)—it 
appears to be natural to obtain a normalized measure of poverty—call it π*—in terms of 
the area beneath the GPP expressed as a proportion of the area beneath the line of 
maximal poverty (recall Figure 1). The area beneath the line of maximal poverty (call 
this Area A) is just one-half, while the area beneath the GPP (call this Area B), obtained 
as a sum of the areas of a number of trapezoids, can—with some manipulation— 
be seen to be given by: Area B = Σj=1
KtjTjπj – Σj=1
Ktjπj
2/2. Then, the poverty index  
π* (= Area B/Area A) will be given by 




Turning next to Figure 2, and noting that the Gini coefficient of inequality G* in the 
distribution of subgroup poverty levels is just the area beneath the GPLP divided by the 
area beneath the diagonal of the unit square, it is easy to verify that  
(6) G* = (2/π)[Σj=1
KtjTjπj – Σj=1
Ktjπj
2/2] – 1. 
Making the appropriate substitution from (6) into (5) yields: 
(7) π* = π(1 + G*).  
Comparing (7) with (2′′) reveals that the index π* is just the asymptotic version of the 
index π
oo. 
Suppose the grouping of the population we resorted to were the ‘atomistic grouping’, in 
terms of which each person is regarded as constituting a group by herself/himself, so 
that a typical group—{i}—is the one constituted by person i, for every i∈N. Suppose 
further that xi is the income of the ith poorest person and that, for every i, π{i} is   
given by: π{i} = max{0,1 – xi/z}, that is, a person’s deprivation is measured by the 
proportionate shortfall of her income from the poverty line if she happens to be poor, 
and is taken to be zero otherwise. Under these circumstances, the GPP will be precisely 
what Shorrocks (1995, 1996) calls the poverty gap profile, and the index of aggregate 
poverty corresponding to π* in (7) will be an index ∆ which is given by ∆ = HI(1 + GP), 
where H is the familiar headcount ratio (or proportion of the population in poverty), I is 
the income-gap ratio (or proportionate shortfall of the average income of the poor from 
the poverty line), and GP is the Gini coefficient of inequality in the distribution of the 
poverty gap values. ∆, as it happens, is precisely the poverty index derived by Shorrocks 
(1996), which he shows to be closely related to Sen’s (1976) poverty index, and even 
more proximately so to Thon’s 1979 index, of which ∆ is the replication-invariant 
‘asymptotic’ version. Of the index ∆, Shorrocks says: 
The index obtained by taking the area below the poverty gap   
profile relative to that below the ‘line of maximum poverty’ has a 
particularly appealing interpretation. Although not decomposable across 
population subgroups, it is an ideal poverty index in all other respects.  
Shorrocks (1996: 251)   8
That there is a way of reckoning subgroup poverty in the measurement of aggregate 
poverty which is, substantially, a generalization of a particularly instructive approach to 
poverty measurement as advanced by Shorrocks is, we believe, both interesting and 
useful. We turn now to an instrumental justification for taking seriously the group-wise 
distribution of poverty in the aggregation exercise. 
4  Poverty aggregation when inter-group equality is instrumentally valued 
4.1 Motivation 
This section explores a simple idea on the connection between individual and group 
poverty, and examines some straightforward implications of the idea for the 
measurement of aggregate poverty. The idea in question is this: in principle, how poor a 
person is, is dependent not only on how deprived s/he is, considered as an atomistic 
unit, but also on the general level of prosperity of the group to which s/he is affiliated. A 
good deal of the literature on poverty measurement rests on the view of man as 
economic man, i.e. as an entity wrenched loose from his group moorings. This section 
considers some consequences of taking a view of man as social animal, i.e. as an entity 
whose fortunes are tied, in smaller or larger measure, to the fact of his particular group 
affiliation. Within this setting, certain conventional approaches to, and outcomes of, 
poverty measurement can be seen to emerge as special cases of a more general 
framework that allows for intra-group externality in the determination of individual 
deprivation. 
The issue of how outcomes at the individual level are influenced by the fact of group 
affiliation is well brought out, at a general level, in Loury (2000: 233, 243): 
Economic analysis begins with a depersonalized agent who acts more or 
less independently to make the best of the opportunities at hand … [But] 
[e]ach individual is socially situated, and one’s location within the 
network of social affiliation substantially affects one’s access to various 
resources … There is one view of society in which we are atomistic 
individuals, pursuing our paths to the best of our abilities … But this is a 
false, or at least incomplete, view of how society works. The fact is that 
we are all embedded in a complex web of associations, networks, and 
contacts. We live in families, we belong to communities, and we are 
members of collectivities of one kind or another. We are influenced by 
these associations from the day we are born. Our development—what 
and who we are and become—is nourished by these associations. 
At a more specific level—that of caste in the Indian context—B. R. Ambedkar (cited in 
Guhan 2000: 206) makes a pointed observation about intra-group externality when he 
says: 
Take, for instance, Chamars, you look upon this community with hatred, 
but if there are some lawyers, doctors and educated persons among them, 
you cannot put your hand upon them and you will not do that, although 
everyone of them is not so highly educated. You will say he is a Bhangi   9
but suppose there are educated persons among them, you will respect 
them. 
The thrust of the preceding considerations, when applied to the context of poverty, 
resolves itself into a straightforward principle which constitutes the underlying 
motivation for the present section, and can be stated in terms of the following axiom: 
Axiom of Group-Mediated Deprivation (Axiom GMD). Ceteris paribus, of two poor 
persons having the same income, the person who belongs to the group with a lower 
mean income is more deprived. 
The idea underlying Axiom GMD is that a person’s ability to transform income into 
what Sen (1985) calls functionings is linked to the fortunes of the group to which the 
person is affiliated. This type of intra-group externality could occur in a number   
of ways. It is often the case that the extent to which a poor individual is a beneficiary of 
‘informal social security’, or of credit facilities, or of supplementary nutrition, or of 
assistance in the event of sickness or disability, or of scholarships in educational 
institutions, is an increasing function of the average level of income sufficiency of the 
group to which the person is affiliated. If a poor person’s access to resources varies 
directly with the respect and consideration with which s/he is treated by society at large, 
then such respect and consideration, and therefore personal access to resources, might 
be expected to be positively correlated with the mean prosperity of the group to which 
the person belongs. Moreover, a person’s own sense of advantage is often mediated by 
the economic status of the group of which s/he is a member: even in the absence of 
differentials in income at the inter-personal level, one can expect inter-personal 
differentials in the level of achieved functionings arising from group-mediated 
individual assertiveness, or diffidence, as the case may be. 
In much of what follows, illustrative operational content is given to Axiom GMD. The 
idea is not to claim any particular social realism for the specific formulations pressed 
into service; rather, it is to draw out certain elementary conceptual implications of the 
axiom for poverty comparisons, poverty axiomatics, and related settings of 
measurement. 
4.2  An ‘externality-adjusted’ poverty measure 
Consider any (z,x,g)∈R++xXxG, where (x,g) is a compatible pair. For any person i, let di 
represent i’s deprivation function. It is reasonable to suggest that, for all i∈{1,…,n}: 
di = di(xi,μ
i) 
that is, i’s deprivation level depends on both his own income and the average income of 
the group to which he belongs. Further, we could imagine that di is declining in each of 
xi and μ
i: a person’s deprivation declines as her income increases, and likewise declines 
as the average income of the group to which she is affiliated increases, which captures 
the ‘group externality effect’ postulated by the axiom of group-mediated deprivation. 




i) = 0: the poverty of a completely poor person belonging to a completely 
poor group is unity, while a person who is poor by virtue of his income falling short of 
the poverty line will be taken to approximate to the status of non-poorness as the   10
average income of the group to which he belongs becomes indefinitely large. Finally, a 
person with income equalling or exceeding the poverty line will be taken to be non-
poor, namely di(xi,μ
i) = 0 for xi ≥ z. A functional form for di which satisfies all of the 
requirements stated above is given by 
di(xi,μ
i) = (z - xi)/(z + μ
i). 
The particular specialization resorted to above is not sought to be uniquely 
characterized: it is employed only as a convenient illustrative device. I shall now define 
an ‘externality-adjusted’ poverty index, P*, as a simple average of the individual-
specific deprivation functions, viz. for all z∈R++, and every compatible pair (x,g)∈XxG: 
(8) P*(z,x,g) [ = (1/n)Σi∈Qdi(xi,μ
i)] = (1/n)Σi∈Q[(z – xi)/(z + μ
i)] 
where Q is the set of poor individuals. 
(8) can also be written as 
(9) P*(z,x,g) = (1/n)Σj∈g[Σi∈Q
j{(z – xi)/(z + μj)}] 
where Q
j is the set of poor persons belonging to subgroup j. Notice now that if P*j is a 
shorthand for P*(z,xj,g
u), namely if P*j is the poverty level of the jth subgroup when the 
partitioning of the subgroup’s population is the universal one, then 
(10) P*j = (1/nj)Σi∈Q
j{(z – xi)/(z + μj)} 
where nj is the dimensionality of xj; whence—in view of (9): 
(11) P*(z,x,g) = (1/n)Σj∈gnjP*j = Σj∈gtjP*j 
where tj ≡ nj/n is the population share of the jth subgroup. 
The two polar cases of grouping we have considered earlier are of special interest. 
When the grouping is atomistic, that is, each person is considered to constitute a group 
by himself or herself, then clearly μ
i = xi for all i, whence, in view of (8), we have: 
(12) P*(z,x,g
a) = (1/n)Σi∈Q[(z – xi)/(z + xi)]. 
(12) is the sort of ‘individualistic’ poverty index most widely employed in the poverty 
measurement literature: it turns out to be a special case of the more general formulation 
(8). A matter of some interest is that this poverty index can be independently derived as 
a certain kind of normalized distance function, in the following sense. Given a non-
decreasingly ordered income vector x = (x1,…,xq,xq+1,…,xn), where xq < z and xq+1 ≥ z, 
define the censored version x
c of x as the vector obtained by replacing all the   
non-poor incomes in x by the poverty line income z (see Takayama 1979), so that  
x
c = (x1,…,xq,z,…,z). Let z be the n-vector (z,…,z) and 0 the n-vector (0,…,0). Then 
(see Subramanian 2004a), z can be interpreted as the income distribution with the 
smallest mean which is compatible with a complete absence of poverty, and 0 as the 
income distribution representing total poverty. Let δ(z,x
c) represent the ‘vector distance’ 
between z and x
c (the shortfall of the ‘actual’ situation from the ‘no-poverty’ situation), 
and δ(z,0) represent the vector distance between z and 0 (the shortfall of the ‘complete   11
poverty’ situation from the ‘no-poverty’ situation). Then, in some intuitively 
straightforward sense we could take the ratio of the two distances, call it   
r ≡ δ(z,x
c)/δ(z,0), to be a normalized measure of poverty. It remains to specify the form 
of the distance function δ. One candidate is the Camberra distance function δ
C (see 
Wilson and Martinez 1997) which calculates the distance between any two n-vectors a 
and b as: δ
C(a,b) = Σi=1





n (z/z)]  
 = (1/n)Σi∈Q[(z - xi)/(z + xi)]. 
From (12) and (13) we note that the measure P*(z,x,g
a) is just the normalized Camberra 
distance ratio r
C—which confers a simple and handy interpretation on the poverty index. 
At the other polar extreme, when g = g
u, it can be seen from (8) that 
(14) P*(z,x,g
u) = (1/n)Σi∈Q[(z - xi)/(z + μ)] 
where μ is the mean of the distribution x. This corresponds to the case where there is 
only one group—that constituted by the grand coalition of individuals: the community, 
here, is regarded as being entirely homogeneous. (12) and (14), it may be reiterated, are 
special cases of (8). 
4.3  Some implications of ‘grouping’ for poverty rankings and poverty axiomatics 
4.3.1 Poverty  rankings 
The particular manner in which we choose to partition the population can have non-
trivial implications for poverty comparisons. This proposition can be illustrated by 
means of a simple numerical example. Consider two 5-vectors of income, given, 
respectively, by x = (10,20,30,50,70) and y = (10,20,30,45,76). Let the poverty line  
z be 40. Consider also three alternative groupings of the population: the atomistic 
grouping g
a, the universal grouping g
u, and a grouping g
r by religion which, let us say, 
divides the population into two religious groups 1 and 2 respectively, and   
precipitates the sub-group income vectors x1 = (10,50), x2 = (20,30,70), y1 = (10,45), 
and  y2 = (20,30,76). Routine computation, employing equations (12), (14) and (8) 
respectively, will yield the following results: 
P*(z,x,g
a) = P*(z,y,g
a) = .2152; 
P*(z,x,g
c) = .1579 > P*(z,y,g
c) = .1575; and 
P*(z,x,g
r) = .1607 < P*(z,y,g
r) = .1621. 
For an atomistic grouping of the population, the extent of poverty, as measured by the 
index P*, is the same for both vectors x and y; for the universal grouping, P* suggests 
that poverty is greater in x than in y; and for a grouping according to religion, P* 
certifies that there is more poverty in y than in x. These pairwise rank-reversals indicate 
that it clearly cannot be a matter of indifference how we choose to partition the 
population. In particular, and almost in a spirit of absent-mindedness, the only 
partitioning which has generally been held to be relevant is the atomistic one—to the   12
point that it has conventionally not even been considered to be important to specify the 
particular partitioning invoked as an argument in the poverty function. But some 
concern for how sociology could refine one’s understanding of economics would 
necessarily point to the requirement of engaging actively with the appositeness of the 
particular grouping one resorts to in effecting poverty comparisons. The fact of intra-
group externality induces a heterogeneity between groups that compels the need for a 
context-based attentiveness to the social dimension of economic theorizing. That this 
issue could also have practical implications for the targeting of anti-poverty budgetary 
allocations is straightforward (see Jayaraj and Subramanian 1999, and Subramanian 
2004b). 
4.3.2 Poverty  axiomatics 
What are some of the properties of the poverty index P*, in relation to the ‘standard’ 
axioms of poverty measurement reviewed in Section 2? It is fairly easy to see that P* 
satisfies the monotonicity and normalization axioms; and writing the index in the form 
of equation (12) suggests that it is also decomposable. These may well be the limits of 
P*’s ‘successes’. The focus axiom is violated by P*: the numerical example reviewed in 
the preceding subsection indicates that the vector y has been derived from the vector x 
by changes to the non-poor incomes which have left the numbers of individuals in 
poverty unchanged; yet for both the universal grouping and the grouping according to 
religion, the value of P* is not the same for x and y. The symmetry axiom could also be 
a casualty. If two persons with distinct incomes and belonging to different groups were 
to swap their incomes, then the group-specific means would change, and—see equation 
(10)—the value of P* could also change. It is not hard to perceive that P* could also fall 
foul of the transfer axiom. A progressive transfer of income from a poor person 
belonging to a relatively badly-off group to a poorer person belonging to a relatively 
well-off group could change group-specific means in such a way as to actually cause the 
value of P* to rise, in opposition to what the transfer axiom demands. These issues are 
discussed more elaborately in Jayaraj and Subramanian (1999) and Subramanian 
(2004b). The point to note is that these ‘axiomatic failures’ of an index such as P* are 
not necessarily adverse reflections on P*: they may simply be a reflection of the 
inappropriateness of certain canonical normative properties of poverty measures for 
contexts which demand that we take the notion of groups and social heterogeneity 
seriously. ‘Compensatory discrimination’, ‘affirmative action’, and similar principles of 
group-mediated justice would be impossible to defend if we insisted on swearing 
context-independent allegiance to axioms like focus, symmetry and transfer. 
4.3.3  An application to a non-income dimension: measuring literacy 
Basu and Foster (1998) have shown how the conventional headcount measure of 
literacy could be a misleading indicator of a population’s ‘effective’ literacy status, 
simply because of the failure of this measure to reckon the intra-household externality 
accruing to illiterate members of a household from the literacy of their literate cohorts. 
The externality-related approach to measuring income-poverty outlined in this paper has 
an intimate implication for the Basu-Foster thesis, which is elaborated in what follows. 
Consider a population of n individuals, partitioned into K households. A literate person 
will be taken to have a literacy status of unity, and an illiterate person a literacy status of 
zero. Corresponding to the income-poverty line z, we shall specify a `literacy-poverty 
line’ of unity. Suppose m persons in the n-person population are literate. Then the   13
‘standard’ measure of literacy, R, would be given by the headcount ratio m/n; or, since 
the context of discussion here is deprivation rather than achievement, the standard 
measure of illiteracy is given by R
o ≡ 1 – R. This measure is invariant with respect to 
the precise manner in which the m literates are distributed across the K households. If 
one allowed for a beneficent intra-household externality conferred by the literate 
members of a household on its illiterate members, then one can see that ‘effective 
literacy’ would rise (or ‘effective illiteracy’ would decline) with a more equitable inter-
household distribution of literates. Hence Basu and Foster’s instrumental justification, 
based on an argument of efficiency-promoting externality, for planned literacy 
programmes that aim at equity in the inter-household distribution of literates. Precisely 
the same outcome is secured if illiteracy were to be measured analogously to the way in 
which income-poverty is measured by the index P*. To se this, it is useful to refer to 
equations (9), (10) and (11). 
In the context of illiteracy measurement, we replace z by unity; and ‘xi’ for every 
illiterate person i is zero. For every household j belonging to the set {1,…,K} of 
households, the ‘average’ literacy level is represented by the household’s literacy rate Rj 
(the proportion of literates in the jth household). For every j, Q
j is the set of illiterates in 
household j. It can be noted now from (10) that, if nj is the size of household j, and if qj 
is the cardinality of Q
j, then the ‘externality-adjusted’ or ‘effective’ illiteracy rate of 




j{(1 – 0)/(1 + Rj)} = (qj/nj)/(1 + Rj) 







j ≡ (1 – Rj) is the proportion of illiterates in household j. 
If φj is the population share of household j, then, in view of (11), the ‘effective’ society-
wide illiteracy rate can be written as 
(15) R
o* [ = Σj=1
KφjR
o






Suppose now that the ‘crude’ headcount measure of illiteracy for some community is 
R
o. We consider two situations: in situation 1 the inter-household distribution of 
(il)literacy is an equal one, viz. R
o
j = R
o for all j = 1,…,K. In situation 2, we have a 
completely polarized outcome: all illiterates belong to households without any literates, 
and all literates belong to households without any illiterates. Let the ‘effective’ illiteracy 
rates corresponding to these two situations be denoted, respectively, by R
o*(1) and 
R








Indeed, between them, (16) and (16′) describe the lower and upper limits of the values 
which R





o]. Thus if, for example, 50 
per cent of a population is illiterate, then under situation 1, R
o* = 0.33, whereas under 
situation 2, R
o* = 0.50. The customarily-employed ‘crude’ illiteracy rate, at 0.5 under 
both situations 1 and 2, will be unable to distinguish between the two situations, unlike 
the ‘externality-adjusted’ illiteracy rate R
o*, which favours the equitable inter-  14
household distribution over the inequitable one—precisely the point made by Basu and 
Foster. 
Briefly, the phenomenon of intra-group externality is a pervasive one, and is fruitfully 
applied in the measurement of deprivation in more than one context and in more than 
one dimension. 
5 Concluding  observations 
Horizontal, or inter-group, inequalities in the distribution of poverty are a standard 
feature of many stratified societies. Intrinsic considerations of group fairness would 
dictate a concern for incorporating inequalities in the group-wise distribution of poverty 
directly into the aggregation exercise of poverty measurement. Extant approaches to 
such aggregation procedures have been reviewed in this paper, and in the process, a 
generalization of Shorrocks’ illuminating approach to poverty measurement, involving 
the derivation of ‘deprivation indices’ from ‘deprivation profiles’, has been provided. 
Additionally, inter-group equality in the distribution of poverty could be justified on 
instrumental grounds, from the recognition that the goals of equity and efficiency could 
become congruent because of the presence of group-related externalities and their role 
in determining deprivation at the individual level. Indeed, externalities arising from 
group affiliation are an integral and obvious aspect of everyday social existence, yet 
with few exceptions they would appear to have been largely neglected in the economics 
of measuring deprivation. In this paper, an attempt has been made to incorporate the 
social embeddedness of individuals into an exercise in measuring income-poverty, 
and—along lines motivated by Basu and Foster (1998)—illiteracy. 
The concerns of this paper have been primarily methodological, and accordingly, the 
points it addresses have been sought to be made illustratively rather than definitively. A 
principal reason for this—especially in the context of an instrumental justification for 
taking group inequalities seriously—is the difficulty of actually measuring external 
effects in any precise and unambiguous way, which could well be the reason for their 
general neglect in the literature. Allowing for an explicit reckoning of inter-group 
inequalities in a heterogeneous population, or for group-mediated deprivation, enables 
one to see that how one partitions the population has implications for deprivation 
comparisons, for the appeal of normative properties of deprivation indices that have 
been customarily held to be self-evidently desirable, for practical stratagems of 
budgetary allocation toward redress of deprivation, and for an instrumental defence   
of inter-group equality and ‘reverse’ discrimination. The standardly ‘homogenising’, or 
‘atomistic’, formulations of measurement concerns have been shown to emerge as 
special cases of a more general framework of group-inclusive analysis. Yet, it is the 
‘special case’ of mainstream, or ‘individualistic’, economic theorizing which has held 
sway as the ‘general’ or ‘paradigmatic’ model, against which more socially realistic 
approaches have had to be judged as departures from the norm. As has been stated 
earlier, it is perhaps understandable that measurement exercises are largely confined to 
that which is more, rather than less, tractably measured. But a re-appraisal is also 
necessitated when these severely practical considerations have become overwhelmingly 
successful in preventing conceptual and normative aspects of social reality from 
infecting economic theorizing. 
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